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This paper examines the broader effects of the US financial crisis on global lending to retail customers.
In particular we examine retail bank lending in Germany using a unique data set of German savings
banks during the period 2006 through 2008 for which we have the universe of loan applications and
loans granted.  Our experimental setting allows us to distinguish between savings banks affected by
the US financial crisis through their holdings in Landesbanken with substantial subprime exposure
and unaffected savings banks.  The data enable us to distinguish between demand and supply side
effects of bank lending and find that the US financial crisis induced a contraction in the supply of retail
lending in Germany. While demand for loans goes down, it is not substantially different for the affected
and nonaffected banks.  More important, we find evidence of a significant supply side effect in that
the affected banks reject substantially more loan applications than nonaffected banks.  This result is
particularly strong for smaller and more liquidity-constrained banks as well as for mortgage as compared
with consumer loans. We also find that bank-depositor relationships help mitigate these supply side
effects.
Manju Puri
Fuqua School of Business
Duke University

















1.  Introduction  
 
Krugman and Obstfeld  (2008)  argue that  “one of the most pervasive features of today’s 
commercial banking industry is that banking activities have become globalized” (p.600). An 
important question is whether the growing trend in globalization in banking results in events 




  In particular, it is important to understand the implications for retail customers 
who are a major driver of economic spending and who have been the focus of much  of 
regulators’ attention in dealing with the current crisis. 
The goal of this paper is thus to understand if subsequent to a substantial adverse credit shock 
such as the US financial crisis there is an important global supply side effect for retail customers 
even in banks that are mandated to serve only local customers and countries that are affected 
only indirectly by the crisis.  The paper builds on the existing literature on nonmonetary 
transmissions of shocks to the lending sector (e.g., Bernanke, 1983; and Bernanke and Blinder, 
1988, 1992) and financial contagion (e.g., Allen and Gale, 2000) and asks the following 
questions.  Does the financial crisis affect lending practices in foreign countries with stable 
economic performance? Do the worst-hit banks in these countries reduce their lending?  Does the 
domestic retail customer, e.g., the construction worker in Germany, face credit rationing from his 
local bank as a result? Or is the decreased credit driven by reduced loan applications on the 
demand side by consumers?  If there are supply effects, which type of credit is affected most?  
Do bank-depositor relations help mitigate these effects?  These questions are particularly 
important in the context of retail lending on which there has been relatively little research. 
 
In this paper we address these questions by taking advantage of a unique database.  Our 
experimental setting is that of German savings banks, which provide an ideal laboratory to 
analyze the question of supply side effects on retail customers. Savings banks in Germany are 
particularly interesting to examine as they are mandated by law to serve only their respective 
local customers and thus operate in precisely and narrowly defined geographic regions, 
                                                 
1 Another event along these lines is the spring 2010 sovereign debt crisis in some European countries to which 
European banks in particular have a significant exposure.   
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following a version of narrow banking.  Total lending and corporate lending by savings banks in 
Germany kept increasing even after the beginning of the financial crisis in 2007. However, retail 
lending by savings banks showed a slow and continuous decrease. This raises the question of 
whether the decline in retail credit is due to savings banks rejecting more loan applications. For 
the savings banks we have the universe of loan applications made, along with the credit scoring.  
We also know which loan applications were granted and which were turned down.  Hence we are 
able to directly distinguish between supply and demand effects.  This differentiation is important 
from a policy perspective.  We are able to assess the implications of credit rationing for retail 
customers on which there has been relatively little empirical work. Further, our data set also 
allows us to speak to the kinds of loans that are affected most and also assess if relations help 
mitigate credit rationing in such situations.   
 
The German economy showed reasonable growth and a record-low level of unemployment until 
2008.  Furthermore, the German housing market did not experience the significant increase and 
rapid decline in prices that occurred in US and other European markets and thus did not affect 
German banks. At the same time, some of the German regional banks (Landesbanken) had large 
exposure to the US subprime market and were substantially hit in the wake of the financial crisis.  
These regional banks are in turn owned by the savings banks, which had to make guarantees or 
equity injections into the affected Landesbanken.  We thus have a natural experiment in which 
we can distinguish between affected savings banks (that own Landesbanken affected by the 
financial crisis) and other savings banks.  
 
Our empirical strategy proceeds as follows. Using a comprehensive data set of consumer loans 
for the July 2006 through June 2008 period, we examine whether banks that are affected at the 
onset of the financial crisis reduce consumer lending more relative to nonaffected banks.  We are 
able to distinguish between demand and supply effects.  While we find an overall decrease in 
demand for consumer loans after the beginning of the financial crisis, we do not find significant 
differences in demand as measured by applications to affected versus unaffected savings banks.  
More important, we do, however, find evidence for a supply side effect on credit after the onset 
of the financial crisis.  In particular, we find the average rejection rate of affected savings banks 
is significantly higher than of nonaffected savings banks.  This result holds particularly true for  
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smaller and more liquidity-constrained banks.  Further, we find that this effect is stronger for 
mortgage as compared with consumer loans.  Finally, we consider the change in rejection rates at 
affected banks after the beginning of the financial crisis by rating class. We find that the 
rejection rates significantly increase for each rating class and, in particular, for the worst rating 
classes, but the overall distribution of accepted loans does not change. 
 
We next analyze whether bank-depositor relations affect supply side effects in lending. We are 
interested in whether borrowers at affected banks who have a prior relationship with this bank 
are more likely to receive a loan after the start of the financial crisis. We show a clear benefit to 
bank-depositor relations resulting in significantly higher acceptance rates of loan applications by 
customers in the absence of the financial crisis. Further,  while affected banks significantly 
reduce their acceptance rates during the financial crisis, we find relationships help mitigate the 
supply side effects on bank lending. Customers with relationships with the affected bank are less 
likely to have their loans rejected as compared with new customers. Our results are robust to 
multiple specifications. 
 
Our paper adds to the growing literature on the effects of the globalization of banking. Peek and 
Rosengren (1997), Rajan and Zingales (2003), Berger, Dai, Ongena, and Smith (2003), and Mian 
(2006) analyze the opportunities and limits of banks entering foreign countries and the effect of 
foreign banks lending to corporate firms.  Relatively little research has been done on the effect of 
globalization on retail lending, and on the effect of small savings banks taking on international 
exposure on the bank’s local borrowers in the bank’s home country. Our paper provides evidence 
on this count. We show that borrowers are affected through a direct banking channel when their 
local bank experiences an adverse shock even when the local bank itself practices narrow 
banking but has exposure in a foreign country through its ownership structure. Our paper also 
adds to the growing work that tries to understand the real effects of financial crises. Ivashina and 
Scharfstein (2010) and Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe (2008) study bank lending to corporate 
firms in the US after the onset of the financial crisis.  Gan (2007) and Duchin, Ozbas, and 
Sensoy (2010) show a decline in corporate investments as a consequence of tightened credit 
supply.  Our paper presents complementary evidence on the consumer, or retail side, using an 
experimental setting that enables us to directly distinguish between the demand and supply  
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effects of the financial crisis.  Insofar as retail customers do not have access to other financing 
sources in the same way as corporate customers who can also access public debt or equity 
markets, if there is a supply side effect of bank lending, it is likely to be particularly important 
for retail customers. We find evidence of supply side effect on retail lending after the beginning 
of the financial crisis that is stronger for certain kinds of loans and mitigated by consumer-bank 
relationships. More generally, our paper adds to the broader literature on credit rationing (Stiglitz 
and Weiss, 1981).  While credit rationing has been studied for corporations, limited work 
examines credit rationing for retail loans, especially in times of financial crises.  Finally, our 
paper also speaks to the literature on relationships.  While bank-firm relations are generally 
considered important (see Petersen and Rajan, 1994; and  Berger and Udell, 1995), the 
importance of bank relations for retail customers has received far less attention. Our evidence 
suggests that bank-depositor relationships are important in mitigating credit rationing effects in 
times of financial crises.  
 
The rest of the paper is as follows.  Section 2 gives the institutional background. Section 3 
explains the empirical strategy and proposed methodology.  Section 4 describes the data.  Section 
5 gives the empirical results.  Section 6 does robustness checks.  Section 7 concludes. 
 
 
2. Institutional background and data 
 
We start by describing the institutional background and the data that we use in our paper. 
 
2.1. Savings banks as the owners and guarantors of Landesbanken 
Savings banks and Landesbanken belong to the group of public banks, which form one of the 
three pillars of the German banking system.  The other two pillars are private  banks and 
cooperative banks. There are 11 Landesbanken in Germany, which cover different federal states. 
Table 1 provides an overview of the 11 Landesbanken and their respective owners.  Each 
Landesbank is owned by the federal state (Bundesland) in which it is located as well as the 
savings banks associations in the state, which represent all savings banks in federal states. The 
ownership of a Landesbank by a specific savings bank is thus solely determined by the regional  
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location of this savings bank.  A  savings bank cannot become the owner of a different 
Landesbank in any other state.  Table 1 shows that savings banks own a substantial share of their 
respective Landesbanken. For example, the savings banks association of Bavaria 
(Sparkassenverband Bayern) holds 50% of Bayern LB, which is the Landesbank in Bavaria. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
 
Savings banks are required to provide financial services for customers in their municipality, 
which is referred to as the regional principle. This principle implies that savings banks are 
allowed to generate business only in the municipality in which they operate, but not to expand to 
other regions. In fact, consumer loan applications are rejected if the consumers live in a different 
municipality. Savings banks have the explicit legal mandate not to maximize profits, but to 
provide financial access to the community in which they operate and to customers without access 
to financial services with other financial institutions. The business model of savings banks can 
thus be regarded as a form of narrow banking in which deposits are collected from local 




Their traditional customers have thus been small and medium-size enterprises as well as retail 
customers, and they require low hurdles for the opening of consumer accounts among all 
German banks. In several federal states, savings banks are even legally required to open a current 
account for every applicant on a deposit basis.  
While Landesbanken differ from each other in their exact scope and scale, they have three 
common features (Moody’s, 2004b).  First, Landesbanken serve as the house bank to the federal 
state in which they are located, e.g., by financing infrastructure projects. Second, Landesbanken 
cooperate with the savings banks in their region, serve as their clearing bank, and support them 
in wholesale business such as syndicated lending or underwriting. Third, Landesbanken act as 
commercial banks. 
                                                 
2 Kobayakawa and Nakamura (2000) survey and examine different proposals of narrow banking. They show that the 
content of these proposals varies substantially although they all use the same expression. In particular, some authors 
view narrow banks as institutions that invest only in safe assets, while other authors would also allow these banks to 
lend to small firms. The definition we follow refers to the latter. Savings banks are allowed to give loans to retail 
and mainly small corporate customers in their local community. At the same time, they are not allowed to pursue 
investment banking activities so that their exposure to the US subprime markets stems only from their ownership of 




Debt by the German public bank sector, i.e.,  by savings banks and Landesbanken, was 
traditionally formally guaranteed by the respective public owners. The European Commission 
and the Federal Republic of Germany finally agreed in 2001 to abolish any formal guarantee by 
public owners, as it was felt that this put privately owned banks at a disadvantage. Thus, any debt 
obligation issued by German public banks after July 2005 is not publicly guaranteed in a formal 
way. This is explicitly ruled in the federal states’ savings banks laws. Public ownership and 
political motivations still play a substantial role in the Landesbanken. For example, politicians 
chair the supervisory boards of the Landesbanken and are heavily involved in the appointment of 
the management of the Landesbanken. 
 
But even without a formal guarantee by their respective public owners, additional support 
mechanisms  exist  for  savings banks and Landesbanken. Moody’s (2004b) considers these 
mechanisms as “giving . . . a wider mandate than a mere deposit protection scheme, thereby 
protecting all liabilities of its members and not just deposits” (p.4). For the Landesbanken, in 
principle, there are two support mechanisms, apart from the implicit government guarantee that 
would prevent a systemically relevant bank from becoming insolvent. First, a Landesbank can 
rely on horizontal support from the other Landesbanken. However, Moody’s (2004b) is skeptical 
of this first type of support mechanism and argues that “we believe that both the willingness and 
capacity of Landesbanken to support each other beyond the means already available in the fund 
is questionable”  (p.12).  Likewise, Fitch (2007) does not incorporate the horizontal  support 




Second, a Landesbank can rely on vertical support from the savings banks in its region. This 
support mechanism can take two forms: an informal understanding or a formalized agreement. 
These formalized agreements between Landesbanken and savings bank associations have been 
created in eight of the 16 German federal states: Bavaria, Hesse, Lower Saxony, Mecklenburg-
Western Pomerania,  North  Rhine-Westphalia,  Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, and Thuringia,  (see 
Fitch, 2007).  But even if no formal agreement between Landesbanken and savings banks exist, 
                                                 
3  Fitch (2007) says:  “Hence, for Landesbanks Fitch  …  does not factor horizontal support into its Landesbank 
ratings” (p.8).  
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the general view is that savings banks would rescue their respective Landesbank. Savings banks 
are not only owners of Landesbanken, but they also profit from the wide range of wholesale 
business offered by the Landesbank and are likely to want to protect the brand name.  Thus, 
Moody’s (2004b) argues that “savings banks would, for the foreseeable future, support 
Landesbanken”  (p.14)  and incorporates this support mechanism as  a  rating  floor  for public 
banks. Overall, risks in the business models of Landesbanken are considered to be larger than 
risks in the narrow banking model of local savings banks, which profit from their strong presence 
in retail banking.  
 
In conclusion, Landesbanken can credibly rely on several support mechanisms. While they lack a 
formal guarantee by their public owners for recently issued debt obligations, they can still rely on 
this guarantee for debt obligations issued before 2001 as well as those issued between 2001 and 
2005 and maturing before 2015. In addition, they can rely on formalized vertical support 
mechanisms from their savings banks as one of their major owners. 
 
2.2. The savings banks’ support for Landesbanken in the financial crisis 
Germany’s economy experienced a growth of 2.5% in 2007 and expanded even for a substantial 
part of 2008. Overall gross domestic product (GDP) growth for 2008 amounted to 1.3% and 
became slightly negative only in the second quarter of 2008, while unemployment reached its 
16-year low in October 2008. Furthermore and in contrast to many other countries, house prices 
in Germany remained constant over the decade preceding the US crisis. In fact, according to the 
OECD (2008), even in nominal terms German housing prices did not increase in any single year 
since 1999. As a consequence, German banks have not been affected by a bubble and subsequent 
burst in the national real estate market. However, German banks invested substantially in the US 
and are thus affected by the financial crisis that started in the US subprime real estate market. 
The German banks with the largest exposure in this segment in 2007 were IKB Deutsche 
Industriebank, which was then partially publicly owned, and Sachsen LB, which was the smallest 
of the German Landesbanken with total assets of €68 billion. The exposure for each of these two 
banks amounted to more than €16 billion and thus even exceeded the exposure of significantly 
larger banks such as Deutsche Bank and Commerzbank, according to Moody’s (2007). These 
two banks are also the first German banks that announced massive problems and had to be  
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rescued in the wake of the financial crisis. IKB was  rescued in July 2007 by substantial 
interventions of its owners.  
 
Sachsen LB was the first Landesbank to be directly affected by the financial crisis. It was 
rescued in August 2007 and finally sold to Landesbank Baden-Württemberg so that it ceased to 
exist as a separate entity after April 2008.
4 As shown in Table 1, Sachsen LB was owned by SFG 
(Sachsen-Finanzgruppe or Saxony Financial Group),  which also directly owns eight savings 
banks in Saxony.  Sachsen LB also acted as the wholesale bank for the savings banks in Saxony, 
and Moody’s (2006) argues that the savings banks in Saxony and Sachsen LB were 
interdependent and closely linked to each other.
5
 
 Thus, the savings banks in Saxony were also 
directly affected by Sachsen LB’s massive exposure and its subsequent risk of bankruptcy. As a 
consequence, the minister president of Saxony accepted the political responsibility for the losses 
at Sachsen LB and resigned, reflecting  the political nature of the decision processes in 
Landesbanken. 
Several other and substantially larger Landesbanken were exposed to risky assets in the summer 
of 2007 as well, albeit to a lower level. Moody’s (2007) thus concludes in September 2007 that 
“much of our concern and analysis has focused on German Landesbanks” (p.6), as the substantial 
exposure in combination with “weak profitability and only adequate levels of capitalization” 
would leave “some Landesbanks potentially vulnerable.”  The next two Landesbanken that had 
to announce massive losses were West LB (with total assets of €285 billion) in November 2007 
and Bayern LB (with total assets of €353 billion) in February 2008. Both banks state in their 
quarterly and annual reports that these losses stem directly from their investments in the US 
subprime market. While West LB reported increased profitability and a positive earnings outlook 
in its report for the second quarter of 2007, it stated for the third quarter of 2007 that the previous 
outlook was not valid anymore as the subprime crisis had already resulted in write-downs of 
                                                 
4 The owners of Sachsen LB had to give a guarantee of €2.75 billion to Landesbank Baden-Württemberg (LBBW) to 
convince LBBW to buy Sachsen LB. This is the first-loss guarantee, i.e., the owners of Sachsen LB would have to 
bear losses of up to €2.75 billion before LBBW would step in for higher losses. Given that the Sachsen LB owners 
continue to be at risk, we treat the savings banks in Saxony as affected banks for the full period between August 
2007 and June 2008. 
5  Moody’s (2006)  argues:  “In preparation for the abolition of support mechanisms in 2005, a strong liquidity 
compensation procedure was set up within the SFG group, whereby the SFG savings banks provide Sachsen LB 
with a binding liquidity line of more than €5 billion on a contractual basis” (p.5).  
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€355 million. Similarly, Bayern LB recorded an operating profit of €1 billion for 2007, which 
was more than offset by subprime losses of €1.9 billion. Both banks were heavily criticized for 
revealing this information at a very late stage. In fact, parliamentary control groups later showed 
that these Landesbanken and their owners knew about their massive subprime losses in the third 
quarter of 2007 once the US subprime crisis hit. This is when the owners (savings banks) are 




Landesbank Baden-Württemberg (LBBW) and HSH Nordbank were the final two Landesbanken 
that publicly announced losses from the US  subprime market.  However,  the news came  in 
November 2008 and thus after the end of the sample period. While both banks recorded profits 
for the first half of 2008 and gave a positive outlook for the remainder of the year, they publicly 
acknowledged losses after the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy and officially asked for government 





West LB announced the creation of a bad bank with assets worth €23 billion on February 2, 
2008, along with guarantees worth €5 billion by the owners. The first losses of up to €2 billion 
are to be carried by all shareholders according to their ownership stakes, including the savings 
banks in North Rhine-Westphalia. In particular, as shown in Table 1, the two savings banks 
associations in North Rhine-Westphalia (Rheinischer Sparkassen-  und Giroverband and 
Westfälisch-Lippischer Sparkassen-  und Giroverband) hold more than 50% of West LB. 
Similarly, Bayern LB announced on February 13, 2008 that it would have to write off about €1.9 
billion due to the subprime crisis. As a consequence, the Bavarian savings banks decided on 
April 24, 2008, with a value-weighted majority of 96.9%, to issue a guarantee worth €2.4 billion 
for the portfolio of asset-backed securities of Bayern LB. Similar to Sachsen LB, the losses in 
Bayern LB had political consequences. The former chairman of the supervisory board, who was 
also the Bavarian finance minister until 2007, accepted the responsibility and even apologized to 
the public and to the employees for not being able to avoid the disastrous losses. Thus, the 
savings banks in North Rhine-Westphalia and Bavaria were immediately affected by the losses 
                                                 
6 See http://www.gruene-fraktion-bayern.de/cms/dokumente/dokbin/237/237520.schadensliste_bayernlb.pdf. 




resulting from the subprime exposure of their respective Landesbanken and had to provide 
vertical support. The resulting key question for the subsequent analysis is whether and to what 
extent the affected savings banks react in their lending policies to these losses. 
 
To shed some light on this question, Fig. 1 presents aggregate lending data for savings banks as 
well as for the other banks in Germany, which are provided by the Deutsche Bundesbank, for the 
period between the beginning of 2006 and the end of the second quarter of 2008. Panel A shows 
lending figures for all three pillars of the German banking system (savings banks, cooperatives, 
and private banks), and it shows that total lending keeps increasing even after the beginning of 
the financial crisis in 2007. The same holds for total lending and corporate lending by the 
savings banks, as shown in Panel B of Fig. 1. Both lines show a clear and consistent upward 
trend even after August 2007. In contrast, retail lending by savings banks decreases over the 
same time period. This raises the question of whether the decline is due to retail customers 
asking for a lower amount of loans or to savings banks and affected savings banks rejecting more 
loan applications. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
 
We address this question by analyzing individual loan applications in the sample period between 
July 2006 and June 2008. Until the end of the sample period, Sachsen LB, West LB, and Bayern 
LB were the only Landesbanken that showed losses from the subprime crisis. Fig. 2 illustrates 
the geographical location and reach of these three Landesbanken and shows that these banks 
operate in different regions in Germany. These regions are also heterogeneous in terms of their 
economic development as measured by GDP per capita, unemployment rate, and industry 
structure. While Saxony, which is the home of Sachsen LB and a former part of the German 
Democratic Republic, is among the least wealthy German states, Bavaria, where Bayern LB is 
headquartered, is among the wealthiest German states. North Rhine-Westphalia, which is the 
domicile of West LB and the most populous German state, ranges in the middle.  During the rest 
of this paper, we exploit the exogenous variation as to which German savings banks are affected 
by the subprime mortgage crisis that started in the US  and analyze whether affected banks 




INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE 
 
 
3. Empirical strategy 
We analyze whether credit supply and demand is affected by the financial crisis. In particular, 
we employ a difference-in-differences (DID) approach to analyze the following two questions. 
First, does banks’ supply of credit change when these banks are affected by the financial crisis, 
i.e., do they accept fewer loan applications? Second, does customers’ demand for credit change 
in banks that are affected by the financial crisis, i.e., do customers apply less for loans or do they 
request lower loan amounts? We address these two questions by exploiting the specific setting in 
Germany, where savings banks represent a homogenous group of banks that operate according to 
a model of narrow banking throughout the country and are the owners of their respective 
regional Landesbanken. The identification for the empirical test is based on the fact that some 
but not all of the Landesbanken and thus some but not all of the savings banks are affected by the 
financial crisis.  
 
The Landesbanken in Saxony, North Rhine-Westphalia, and Bavaria are the only Landesbanken 
that publicly announced losses from the US subprime crisis until the end of our sample period in 
June 2008. The savings banks in these regions are thus affected as well due to their respective 
ownership. There are two ways in which the exact event date for these savings banks can be 
defined. First, it can be defined based on the first public  announcement of losses by their 
respective Landesbanken, which is the third quarter of 2007 for Sachsen LB, the fourth quarter 
of 2007 for West LB, and the first quarter of 2008 for Bayern LB. Second, it can be defined 
based on the first private announcement of losses by their respective Landesbanken, as, for 
example, in supervisory board meetings, which are attended by savings banks representatives. As 
the previously described results of the parliamentary control groups show, Landesbanken and 
their owners knew about the losses from the US subprime crisis up to six months before the 
public announcement of these losses. The event date based on this criterion is thus the third 
quarter of 2007 for all three Landesbanken. For the main empirical specification in this paper, we  
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follow the second event definition, based on privately available information. In Section 6 we 
show the results from the first event definition, based on publicly available information. 
 
All the remaining Landesbanken do not show losses from the US subprime crisis during the 
sample period. The savings banks in these regions are thus treated as nonaffected banks in the 
empirical specification. This also includes the owning savings banks of LBBW and HSH 
Nordbank as they show their first losses only in November 2008. However, to check the 
robustness of our results, we include these savings banks as affected banks for the latter part of 
the sample period (or alternatively leave them out) and rerun our empirical specifications. The 
results, which are discussed in Section 6, do not change. 
 
We thus use two sources of identifying variation: the time before and after the financial crisis as 
well as the cross section of savings banks affected and not affected by the crisis based on the 
privately available information on the subprime losses that their Landesbanken have incurred. 
We estimate the following regression: 
 
Yi,b,t = Ab + Bt + δ*Xi,b,t + (β1 * Affected * Post-August2007)                             (1) 
+ (β2 * Nonaffected * Post-August2007) + εi,b,t. 
 
Yi,b,t takes a value of one if a loan application by customer i at bank b at time t is successful and 
zero otherwise. A and B are fixed effects for banks and time, respectively, and Xi,b,t are individual 
controls that capture each borrower’s risk as measured by the internal scoring. Affected is a 
dummy variable that takes a value of one if a savings bank is an owner of a Landesbank that is 
affected by the financial crisis, and Nonaffected is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if a 
savings bank is an owner of a Landesbank that is not affected by the financial crisis. Post-
August2007 is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the loan application is made after 
August 2007, i.e., after the bailout of Sachsen LB and thus the beginning of the financial crisis, 
and zero otherwise. Finally, εi,b,t is an error term. The key variables of interest are the interaction 
terms Affected * Post-August2007 and Nonaffected * Post-August2007. We are interested in the 
difference between these two variables to see whether loan acceptance rates differ after the 
beginning of the financial crisis between savings banks that are affected by the crisis relative to  
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4. Data description and summary statistics 
 
We describe next in detail the data sources for our analyses and provide summary statistics. 
 
4.1. Data sources 
We obtain demand and supply data for the universe of consumer and mortgage loans by savings 
banks in Germany. These data are provided by S-Rating, which is the rating subsidiary of the 
German Savings Banks Association (DSGV), and present a unique opportunity to explore 
changes in demand and supply in consumer lending after the start of the financial crisis. These 
data span the time period between July 2006 (Q3-2006) and June 2008 (Q2-2008) and thus are 
equally made up of subperiods before and after the beginning of the financial crisis in August 
2007.  
 
We use only completed loan applications, so for each application we have an “accept” or “reject” 
decision. The final data set has 1,296,726 consumer and mortgage loan applications made by 
1,117,175 borrowers to 357 different banks. We have information about the internal rating of the 
borrower for 1,244,441 observations. For the subsample of mortgage loans, which has 317,616 
observations, we also have information on the loan amount requested by the borrower. 
 
There are five major advantages of this data set for the purpose of our study. First, it contains 
information on borrowers’ loan applications as well as the banks’ decisions for each individual 
loan application. This is a considerable advantage over, for example, Loan Pricing Corporation’s 
Dealscan Database, which reports only  the terms of actual loans. The combination of loan 
applications and loans granted enable us to clearly separate out the demand and supply effects in 
bank lending. Second, the loan decisions for retail borrowers constitute a separate approval 
                                                 
8 Alternatively, one could rewrite the interaction terms as ß1*Affected + ß2*Post-August2007 + ß3*Affected*Post-
August2007, which is the familiar difference-in-difference estimator (see, e.g.,  Gruber and Poterba, 1994).  
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process by the bank and are provided as a lump sum. Unlike loans to corporate borrowers, they 
are thus not drawn down in fluctuating amounts over time. Third, we are able to obtain data on 
the bulk of the universe of savings banks in Germany, which use S-Rating’s internal rating 
system in their lending decision process and transfer loan and borrower data back to S-Rating. 
This is thus a comprehensive data  set, as the savings banks’ market share in retail lending 
amounts to more than 40% in Germany, one of the world’s largest bank-based financial systems. 
Fourth, the internal rating system meets the regulatory (Basel II) requirements ensuring the 
quality of the data used in this study. Fifth and finally, the large number of loan applications in 
the sample and the detailed information on  each of these applications provides a unique 
opportunity to examine the differential treatment of new versus relationship customers. 
 
4.2. Loan and borrower characteristics 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the loans and loan applicants in our sample. Of the total 
of 1,296,726 loan applications, 49.3% are made in the period after August 2007. Of the loan 
applications, 36.5% are made to banks that are affected by the crisis, and the major portion of our 
data is consumer loan applications (71.5%). Of all applications, 18.0% are made to the affected 
banks after August 2007, while 31.3% are made to the nonaffected banks. On average, 95.6% of 
all applications are accepted, and the average loan amount from the mortgage loan subsample 
amounts to 86,609 euros. On average, there are 40 loan applications to each bank per week. 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
 
The primary measure of borrower credit risk in this study is the borrower’s internal rating. This 
is based on a quantitative score, which uses a scorecard at the loan application stage to facilitate 
and standardize the credit decision process across all savings banks. This credit score adds up 
individual scores based on age, occupation (for example, nature of an applicant’s job and years 
the applicant has been in the job), and monthly repayment capacity based on the borrower’s 
available income. The score also contains information on the existence and use of the borrower’s 
credit lines, as well as assets held in the bank. Based on past defaults of borrowers with similar 
characteristics, this score is consolidated into an internal credit rating, which is associated with a 
default probability of the borrower. Instead of using the individual borrower characteristics, we  
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use the internal rating as it captures not only these characteristics but also additional private 
information of the banks as to past defaults of comparable borrowers.  There are consistent rating 
bins for the internal ratings from April 1, 2007.  Prior to this date we have the rating score, which 
we map into the same bins to ensure comparability over time.   
 
The internal rating ranges from 1 to 12, with 1 being associated with the lowest default 
probability. The average rating in our sample is 6. Furthermore, 94.1% of the loan applications 
are made by relationship customers. An applicant has a relationship with the bank if he has a 




Table 3 presents aggregate acceptance rates for affected versus nonaffected banks over time. 
Between the third quarter of 2006 and the second quarter of 2007, acceptance rates of both types 
of banks are similar, ranging from 97.2%  to 98.3%. Starting in the third quarter of 2007, 
acceptance rates significantly drop within the group of affected banks. In particular, they drop 
from 97.6% in the second quarter of 2007 to 84.9% in the second quarter of 2008, but they 
remain unchanged among the nonaffected banks. The apparent similarity in acceptance rates 
between affected and nonaffected banks before the beginning of the financial crisis and the 
apparent difference between these two groups afterward provide  further motivation for the 




5. Empirical results 
 
This section describes the main empirical analyses for loan demand and supply at affected and 
nonaffected banks and the impact of bank-borrower relationships. 
 
5.1. Loan acceptance rates after the beginning of the financial crisis 
We start analyzing the question of whether demand or supply effects are important in explaining 
the reduction in consumer loans after August 2007 by examining changes in acceptance rates of 
                                                 
9 The regional principle excludes the possibility that a borrower has relationships with multiple sample banks.  
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loan applications at the onset of the financial crisis. We use a difference-in-differences 
framework  to identify a differential effect on affected versus nonaffected banks. The key 
identifying assumption is that trends related to loan acceptance rates are the same among affected 
and nonaffected banks in the absence of the financial crisis and are, therefore, perfectly captured 
by the class of nonaffected banks. This assumption obtains casual justification based on the 
parallel trend of acceptance rates as observed in Table 3. 
 
5.1.1. Bivariate results  
Table 4 presents bivariate results of the mean DID estimates of loan acceptance rates for affected 
and nonaffected banks. We report the mean acceptance rates for these two groups as well as the 
difference within each group before and after August 2007 and also the difference between the 
groups. Panel A reports the results for the pooled sample of consumer and mortgage loans, Panel 
B presents the results for consumer loans, and Panel C shows the results for mortgage loans. 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses, and  the number of observations is reported in 
brackets. The DID estimate is in bold.  
 
The acceptance rates of both types of banks before the start of the financial crisis in August 2007 
are shown in the first row. While the difference between the two groups is 0.2 percentage points 
on average and statistically significant at the 1% level, the mean acceptance rate is 97.6% and of 
similar economic magnitude in the pooled sample as well as in the subsamples of mortgage and 
consumer loans. These results are consistent with Table 3. 
 
Column 1 indicates that overall acceptance rates decrease on average by 4.1% after the start of 
the financial crisis. Most important for the purpose of our study, we find for the within-group 
variation in lending that nonaffected banks decrease their overall acceptance rates by 0.1%, 
which is statistically only weakly significant and economically almost negligible. In contrast, 
affected banks substantially decrease their lending activity by 11.1%  on average,  which is 
significant at the 1% level. As a result, the DID estimates suggest affected banks reduce lending 
by 11%, relative to nonaffected banks, which can be interpreted as the effect of the financial 
crisis on the supply of loans. We observe the same level of magnitude for the DID estimates of 




In Panel D of Table 4, we present mean DID estimates for the pooled sample as a function of the 
borrowers’ internal rating. We report the acceptance rates for each rating class and for affected 
and nonaffected banks both before and after August 2007 as well as three differences. The first 
difference is calculated for the comparison of acceptance rates of affected and nonaffected banks 
before August 2007. The figures show that the differences in acceptance rates between both 
groups and across the different rating classes are negligible. The second difference applies to the 
comparison of affected and nonaffected banks after August 2007. The differences in acceptance 
rates range from 8.5% to 18.9% and are highly statistically significant across all rating classes. 
The differences are highest for the two worst rating classes. They amount to 18.9% for rating 
class 11 and 16.0% for rating class 12.  These results for the comparison of acceptance rates by 
rating class are consistent with a slight migration to quality by affected banks, which tend to 
concentrate less on customers with the worst credit ratings. As a consequence, the third 
difference, which is presented in the last column and shows the DID estimates, is a continuous 
increase for the worst rating classes. While the DID estimates range about 10% for rating classes 
1 to 8, they start increasing with rating class 9 and amount to 15.7% for rating class 11 and 
15.0% for rating class 12. Overall, the DID estimates indicate a robust result: Affected banks 
statistically and economically significantly reduce lending relative to nonaffected banks after 
August 2007 across all rating classes and tend to reduce it most for the worst rating classes. We 
further analyze and interpret the underlying reasons for this consistent decline across rating 
classes in our discussion of Table 6 in Subsection 5.1.2, where we more formally examine the 
overall distribution of borrower risk at affected banks before and after the crisis hit. 
 
5.1.2. Multivariate results 
To further control for the possibility that the differences in acceptance rates reported in Table 3 
are due to changes in the characteristics of the affected or nonaffected banks over time, we 
further estimate linear probability models as shown in Eq. (1) for loan acceptance rates that 
control for these characteristics.
10
                                                 
10 Even if there are no relative changes in group characteristics between owners and nonowners, using covariates in 
regression DID can reduce the sampling variance of the DID estimator (Gruber and Poterba, 1994). 
  Our main control variable is the applicant’s internal rating at 
the time she applies for the loan. We further include bank-specific and time fixed effects. In  
 
19 
some specifications, we also include a consumer confidence index that captures general trends in 
the economy.   
 
Table 5 reports fixed effect linear probability models (LPM) of loan acceptance rates.
11 We 
choose a linear model despite the binary nature of our dependent variable, which should favor 
nonlinear (probit or logit) models. The reason is that nonlinear models suffer from an incidental 
parameters problem, i.e., the fixed effects and, more important, the coefficients of the other 
control variables cannot be consistently estimated in large but narrow panels (with T fixed and N, 
the number of groups, growing infinitely).
12
 
 Linear models, however, can consistently estimate 
the coefficients of our main explanatory variables and therefore provide an economically 
meaningful measure for the link between the financial crisis and the lending behavior of banks in 
our setting. Our results are robust to probit as alternative estimation method. We provide a more 
detailed discussion and comparison of the linear probability model and the probit model (with 
and without fixed effects) in Section 5.  
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE 
 
Panel A reports regression results for the pooled sample of consumer and mortgage loans, and 
Panels B and C report separately the results for the consumer and mortgage loan subsample. 
Heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors are shown in parentheses. The estimation controls 
for bank and year fixed effects, which, in addition to the intercept, are not shown. Models 3, 6, 
and 9 further adjust the standard errors for possible autocorrelation at the bank level. The key 
variable of interest is presented in the diagnostic section of Panel A of Table 5, which reports the 
DID estimate as well as the p-value from the Wald test under the null hypothesis that the DID 
estimate is equal to zero.  
 
                                                 
11 The LPM is measured by ordinary least squares (OLS). We do not use weighted least squares (WLS) even though 
the weights (the conditional variance function) can be easily estimated from the underlying regression function. 
However, if this estimate is not very good, the WLS have worse finite sample properties than OLS and inferences 
based on asymptotic theory might be misleading (Altonji and Segal, 1996). 
12 The inconsistency of the incidental parameters (fixed effects) arises because the number of incidental parameters 
N increases without bounds while the amount of information about each parameter is fixed (Neyman and Scott, 
1948). The coefficients of the other control variables are generally also inconsistent (Andersen, 1973 and 
Wooldridge, 2002).  
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The coefficients on the control variables are as expected, i.e., higher quality applicants are more 
likely to get loans. More important for the purpose of our study, our results confirm the 
conclusions from Table 4. Even after controlling for other factors and each borrower’s internal 
rating, we find that affected banks significantly reduce acceptance rates of loans after August 
2007 while nonaffected group banks even increase consumer lending by 1.1%. The significance 
of the latter result vanishes though once we allow for autocorrelation at the bank level. The DID 
estimate of 8.2% is highly significant in any specification and corresponds to 73% of the effect 
estimated in Table 4. The economic magnitude of this result is large. A decrease in consumer 
lending by 8.2% is equivalent to saying that rejection rates almost double for affected banks. 
 
Panel B of Table 5 reports the regression DID  results for the subsample of consumer and 
mortgage loans. The results are similar to the results from the full sample. The DID estimate is 
7.3%  for consumer loans and 12.2%  for mortgages.  The LPM results are in line with the 
bivariate DID estimates in Table 4 and suggest that affected banks respond to the financial crisis 
significantly restricting the access to loans. The diagnostic section of Panel B further reports the 
p-value from the Wald test under the null hypothesis that, within the group of affected banks, 
loan applicants for mortgage loans are as likely to be accepted as applicants for consumer loans 
after the start of the financial crisis. We can reject this hypothesis at any confidence level. This 
result is intuitively plausible, as mortgage loans represent a more significant commitment of the 
bank vis-à-vis their borrowers as compared with consumer loans. In other words, if the affected 
banks are concerned with being forced to inject considerable equity into their Landesbanken and 
curtail lending accordingly, the likelihood of being rejected should be positively related to the 
commitment the banks make by extending the loan. And the difference in the reduction in 
acceptance rates is sizable between both types of loans with the reduction being almost twice as 
large for mortgage loans. Taken together, our results suggest that banks constrain lending as a 
result of the financial crisis. 
 
An important question is which of the affected banks curtail lending the most. To investigate 
this, we exploit the heterogeneity among the 146 affected savings banks in our sample. We 
observe these banks in the time period after August 2007 and analyze  in a cross-sectional 
regression as to how bank-specific characteristics affect their lending decisions. As we are  
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interested in the effect of bank characteristics such as size and liquidity, which are recorded only 
on a yearly basis for our sample banks, we cannot use bank fixed effects in this empirical 
specification as the fixed effects would absorb our variables of interest. To account for possible 
autocorrelation at the bank level, we cluster standard errors accordingly.
13
 
  Bank size is the 
natural logarithm of total assets measured in millions of euros. Liquidity is the ratio of the bank’s 
cash and marketable securities to its total assets.  
The results for the cross-sectional regressions are reported in Table 6. We report the results for 
both bank size and liquidity for the pooled sample (Models 1 and 4) as well for the subsamples 
of consumer loans (Models 2 and 5) and mortgage loans (Models 3 and 6). Model 1 shows that 
larger affected banks are more likely to accept loan applications after the onset of the financial 
crisis compared with smaller affected banks. The coefficient for bank size is significant at the 1% 
level. These results suggest that smaller banks are hit much more severely by the financial crisis 
and their resulting obligation to help their respective Landesbank than larger banks. Mortgage 
loans represent a more significant commitment of banks vis-à-vis their borrowers. Consequently, 
we expect the effect of bank size to be more pronounced in the subsample of mortgage loans. We 
repeat the regression specification used in Model 1 in subsamples of consumer and mortgage 
loans and find empirical support for our hypothesis. The effect of bank size is almost twice as 
high for mortgage compared with consumer loans. One possible explanation for this result is that 
smaller banks do not have sufficient liquidity left after injecting additional capital into their 
Landesbanken. In fact, the correlation of bank size and liquidity before the crisis amounts to 0.56 
and is significant at the 1% level. In Models 4 to 6, we test this relation more formally and find 
that banks with higher liquidity ratios show substantially larger acceptance rates than banks with 




 We test this separately for consumer and mortgage loans and find that this effect 
almost triples for mortgage loans, which is again consistent with mortgage loans constituting a 
larger commitment compared with consumer loans. 
                                                 
13 We also use a diff-in-diff-in-diff specification with bank size and liquidity as a third type of identifying variation 
apart from the time before and after August and the difference between affected and nonaffected banks. The results 
do not change. 
14 See also Jiménez, Ongena, Peydró, and Saurina (2010) for the effect of liquidity on credit supply in Spain.   
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INSERT TABLE 6 HERE 
 
Do affected banks reduce their lending to preserve liquidity or to reduce portfolio risk?  Our 
analysis help throw some light on this question.  Panel D of Table 4 suggests that affected 
savings banks reduce lending relative to nonaffected savings banks across all rating classes, with 
a slight migration to quality.  Even for the highest quality customers, we find an economically 
sizable effect of 9 to 10 percentage points.  It is worth asking if the overall risk distribution of 
loans made is significantly different for affected versus nonaffected banks.  Given our large 
sample size and given the fact that the chi-square coefficient is sensitive to it, we use a variant of 
the chi-square test that controls for the sample size effect to test for this.  We employ Cramer’s V 
as the most commonly used measure, which is bounded between zero and one with zero showing 
no and one showing perfect association (See Cramer, 1999).  We find that the risk distribution of 
accepted loans before or after August 2007 is not different for affected banks or nonaffected 
banks (Cramer’s V of 0.023 and 0.032,  respectively). Similarly, the comparison of the risk 
distribution of accepted  loans between affected and nonaffected banks shows no difference 
before or after August 2007 (Cramer’s V of 0.048 and 0.042, respectively).  Thus, the overall 
distribution does not change despite the slight migration to quality as observed in Table 4.   
 
Our results in Table 6 further speak to the question of whether the affected banks reduce lending 
to preserve liquidity or to reduce portfolio risk. Table 6 suggests that small banks and banks with 
low levels of liquidity are more likely to reject loan applications among the affected savings 
banks.  We investigate this further by analyzing the distribution of ex ante borrower quality 
among small and large affected banks using a chi-square test.  If the banks’ primary concern is to 
reduce risk, we expect to find a significant change in the risk distribution of loans made before 
and after August 2007 for small versus large banks.  We do not find evidence for an association 
of ex ante borrower quality and whether or not the affected bank is small or large. Cramer’s V, 
our measure of association, is 0.0287 before August 2007 and 0.0319 after August 2007.  This 
suggests that there is no change in ex ante borrower quality for small versus large banks.   
 
Taken together, our results indicate that the banks hit hardest on liquidity reduced lending more 
but did not change the risk distribution of loans.  Our results suggest that preserving liquidity  
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instead of reducing portfolio risk seems to be the primary reason that affected savings banks 
reduce lending after August 2007. 
 
5.2. The demand for loans after the beginning of the financial crisis 
The main objective in this paper is to separate supply and demand effects of the financial crisis 
on consumer lending. So far we have analyzed the supply effects, and we now turn to examine 
whether the demand for loans from borrowers has changed as a consequence of the financial 
crisis. We focus on two possible ways in which loan demand could be affected. First, there could 
be a general decline in demand throughout Germany. Second, customers from affected savings 
banks could reduce demand more relative to customers from nonaffected banks. This can be 
tested within the same framework we use to analyze supply effects in lending. The coefficients 
β1 and β2 from Eq. (1) show the general trend, and the difference between both coefficients is an 
estimate as to how consumer demand is affected. The dependent variable is a proxy for loan 
demand. In Subsection 5.2.1., we use the number of loan applications per week as the dependent 
variable. In Subsection 5.2.2., we use the natural logarithm of the loan amount requested by the 
borrower as a proxy for loan demand. 
 
5.2.1. The number of loans requested by applicants 
Table 7 reports the regression results for the number of loans requested by borrowers each week. 
We report the regression results for the pooled sample of consumer and mortgage loans in 
Columns 1 and 2, the results for consumer loans in Columns 3 and 4, and the results for 
mortgage loans in Columns 5 and 6. The regressions are estimated using a fixed effect OLS 
model and a negative binomial model (NBM) with fixed effects to account for the count data 
nature of the dependent variable. We further adjust the standard errors for possible 
autocorrelation at the state level. The diagnostic section of the table reports the DID estimate as 
well as the p-value from the Wald test under the null hypothesis that the DID estimate is equal to 
zero. The unit of our analysis is the number of weekly loan applications to each single bank and 
not an individual loan application. This reduces our sample size compared with Table 4 and 
Table 5. Accordingly, to control for borrower risk, we use the mean internal rating, which is the 
average of the internal rating score across all loan applications per bank in a given week. When 
using the negative binomial model, we further report the likelihood ratio test and in each case  
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reject the null hypothesis that conditional mean and median of the number of weekly loan 
applications are identical. The statistically significant evidence of overdispersion indicates that 
the negative binomial model is preferred to the Poisson regression model. We further do not find 
an elevated number of zeros in the dependent variable and therefore do not report the regressions 
using either Poisson or the zero-inflated Poisson model. Intercept, bank, and time fixed effects 
are not shown. Heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
 
INSERT TABLE 7 HERE 
 
The regression results indicate a decline in the number of loan applications for both affected and 
nonaffected banks by 8.1 and 9.7 loans per week, respectively. To assess the economic 
magnitude of the result, we evaluate this number at the average number of loan applications, 
which amounts to 40. In other words, the change in the number of loan applications is 
approximately 20% to 25% of the average number of weekly loan applications during our sample 
period, and it is statistically significant at the 1% level in almost all specifications. The results of 
the negative binomial model are consistent with this interpretation. The DID estimates, however, 
are insignificant in all tests. Taken together, borrowers’ loan demand decreases after August 
2007, but it does not decrease significantly more at banks that are affected by the financial crisis. 
The overall decrease in borrower demand despite the stable economic environment in Germany 
during the sample period suggests that customers anticipate a deterioration of the economic 
climate and adjust their borrowing behavior accordingly. 
 
5.2.2. The amount of loans requested by applicants 
We next examine whether customers, given that they apply for a loan, request lower loan 
amounts. We therefore use the natural logarithm of the loan amount requested by the borrower as 
proxy for loan demand.
 Loan amounts are available for the subset of 317,583 mortgage loans in 
our sample. Our main control variable is the applicant’s internal rating at the time she applies for 
the loan. We further include bank-specific and time fixed effects. In some specifications, we also 




Table 8 reports the results using a fixed effect OLS model. Column 3 further adjusts the standard 
errors for possible autocorrelation at the state level. The diagnostic section of the table reports 
the DID estimate as well as the p-value from the Wald test under the null hypothesis that the DID 
estimate is equal to zero. Intercept, bank,  and year fixed  effects  are not shown. 
Heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors are shown in parentheses. Among affected and 
nonaffected banks, loan amounts decline by 4.9% and 4.5%, respectively, after August 2007. 
This result suggests that there is an overall decline in loan demand in Germany that is significant 
at the 1% level. The significance, however, dissipates if we allow for autocorrelation at the state 
level. Furthermore, the DID estimate in the diagnostic section is 0.0046, which is insignificant in 
all tests. Overall, the results indicate that there is not much evidence for a decrease in loan 
amounts after August 2007 and thus for a causal effect of the financial crisis on the loan amount 
requested by applicants at least until June 2008.  
 
INSERT TABLE 8 HERE 
 
5.3. Bank-borrower relationships after the beginning of the financial crisis 
A natural question relates to the role of relationships in credit rationing.  Our results so far 
suggest that customers of affected banks are more likely to have their loan applications rejected.  
Do customers with bank relationships benefit from them and thus have a higher likelihood of 
being approved during a financial crisis? To answer this question, we test whether applications 
by existing customers of affected banks are more likely to be approved than by new customers at 
the same bank after the start of the financial crisis. A possible approach is to do a difference-in-
differences test for acceptance rates of relationship versus nonrelationship customers before and 
after August 2007 within the group of affected banks. However, changes in acceptance rates of 
relationship versus nonrelationship applicants over time that are not caused by the financial crisis 
could cause a spurious correlation. A difference in acceptance rates between both groups would 
thus be falsely attributed to the crisis.  
 
To avoid this problem, we use a difference-in-difference-in-difference framework, which is 
tested in the same way as in Gruber and Poterba (1994). In addition to the time before and after 
August 2007 as well as the cross section of savings banks that are affected or not affected by the  
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crisis, we use the relationship status as  the  third source of identifying variation. In this 
framework, the change in acceptance rate by relationship status of nonaffected savings banks 
serves  as a control for a general trend related to acceptance rates by relationship versus 
nonrelationship borrowers. The difference-in-difference-in-difference nets out any relationship 
effect on acceptance rates due to unobservables or quality variables (Ashenfelter and Craft, 
1985). 
                         
Yi,b,t = Ab + Bt + δ*Xi,b,t + (β1 * Post-August2007) + (β2 * Relationships)  
        + (β3 * Affected * Post-August2007) + (β4 * Relationships * Post-August2007)                  (2) 
        + (β5 * Affected * Relationships) + (β6 * Affected * Post -August2007 * Relationships)+εi,b,t,r 
 
The variables Post-August2007  and  Affected  are defined in the same way as before. 
Relationships is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if an existing customer applies for a 
loan and zero otherwise. The key variable of interest is the triple interaction term Affected * 
Post-August2007  *  Relationships. This variable thus measures whether existing customers 
receive better treatment than new customers after the beginning of the financial crisis when their 
bank is affected by the financial crisis; or, to put it in a different way, whether existing 
relationships to a bank are valuable in times of a financial crisis when this bank is affected by the 
crisis. Our inference is thus based on the coefficient β6. 
 
Table 9 reports the regression results. Similar to Table 5, we use a linear probability model with 
fixed effects and fit regression Eq.  (2) to the pooled sample as well as the subsample of 
consumer and mortgage loans. Intercept, bank,  and year fixed effects are not shown. 
Heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors are shown in parentheses. The results support our 
earlier findings. The coefficient β3 (Affected * Post-August2007) corresponds to our earlier DID 
estimate in Table 5. The estimate is of similar magnitude indicating that customers of affected 
banks have an 8.1% lower probability of being approved than customers of nonaffected banks. 
The secular effect of relationships is positive and significant,  indicating that bank-depositor 
relationships are valuable even in the absence of the financial crisis. Relationship customers are 
2.8%  more likely to receive a loan compared with new customers. Most important  for the 
purpose of this study, our results are consistent with relationship customers benefiting from  
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lending relationships during the financial crisis. The coefficient of the variable Affected * Post-
August2007 * Relationships is positive and significant at the 1% level. Holding everything else 
constant, applications by  relationship customers are 4.9% more likely to be approved after 
August 2007 relative to new customers. This result holds also in the subsamples of consumer and 
mortgage loans. Relationship customers have a 4.1% higher likelihood of being approved than 
new customers when they apply for a consumer loan and a 1.8% higher likelihood of being 
approved when they apply for a mortgage loan.  
 
INSERT TABLE 9 HERE 
 
The diagnostic section of Table 8 further reports the Wald test under the null hypothesis that the 
treatment effect is identical in the subsample of consumer and mortgage loans. We reject the 
hypothesis and confirm the earlier evidence that mortgage loans are significantly less likely to be 
approved relative to consumer loans. While relationships are important and significant for both 
types of loans, the diagnostic section also shows that they are most important for consumer 
loans. This suggests that the information that a bank generates from a customer relationship is 
most important in approvals of loans that are not secured by collateral and hence the repayment 
and recovery rate probably depend on the borrower’s creditworthiness than the value of the 
collateral. This result is consistent with the literature on small business lending. For example,   
Berger and Udell (1995) show that relationships are less relevant for mortgage loans relative to 




In this section, we provide several additional analyses to test the validity of the empirical 
specification and the robustness of the results. 
 
 
6.1. Linear probability model versus probit model 
In Table 5 and Table 9 we use the LPM to fit a regression with a binary dependent variable. This 
empirical testing strategy could be questioned as the LPM is heteroskedastic and it can predict  
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values on the interval minus to plus infinity. For these two reasons, nonlinear models as for 
example probit models are commonly used to fit binary data. However, in a panel-data setting, 
the LPM has an important advantage over probit models. While the incidental parameters cannot 
be consistently estimated if N→∞  and  T  is  fixed,  the  other  explanatory  variables  are √ N 
consistent (Wooldridge, 2002).  In probit models, the explanatory variables are generally 
inconsistent. In this subsection, we fit a probit model with and without fixed effects to the data 
and compare the results. In Table 10, we estimate the probability that a bank accepts a loan 
application. Only the coefficients for the key explanatory variables are shown for the LPM. The 
reported coefficient in the probit models is the effect of a marginal change in the corresponding 
variable on the probability that a loan application is approved, computed at the sample mean of 
the independent variables. Heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors are shown in 
parentheses. Table 10 further reports the p-value of the Wald test under the null hypothesis that 
the DID estimate is zero. 
 
INSERT TABLE 10 HERE 
 
The LPM coefficients are taken from Model 2 in Table 5. The results confirm our previous 
finding. In particular, the magnitude of the coefficients in the probit model without fixed effects 
is generally similar to that in the LPM. Even though the DID estimate is about 2% smaller in the 
mortgage loan sample using the probit model, the difference in the DID  estimate between 
consumer and mortgage loans is still significant at the 1%  level. The magnitude of the 
coefficients in the probit model with fixed effects is 50% smaller compared with both alternative 
models. For example, the DID estimate in the pooled sample is 4% vis-à-vis 8% in the LPM. 
Most important, the overall result of this paper, i.e., banks reduce the supply of loans as a 




6.2. Geographic proximity and access to credit 
We argue in Subsection 2.2 that the three affected Landesbanken operate in different geographic 
regions in Germany, which are also heterogeneous in their economic development.  The results  
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in this paper are thus unlikely to be determined by a common economic shock that only affects 
these regions but not any other region in Germany.  Nonetheless, we conduct additional 
robustness checks.  In particular, we follow the methodology in Huang (2008) and compare the 
lending behavior of geographically contiguous savings banks,  which belong  to different 
Landesbanken.  We compare the lending behavior of a savings bank in a federal state with an 
affected Landesbank with  that of a neighboring savings bank in a federal state without an 
affected Landesbank. As geographically contiguous savings banks face very similar economic 
conditions and only differ in their respective Landesbank ownership, this is a clean test to 
observe whether the change in lending behavior is due to the Landesbanken losses. 
 
We thus repeat the empirical analysis from Table 5 for only those contiguous savings banks in 
which one is affected through its Landesbank and the other one is not.  We have 31 groups of 
affected and not affected savings banks. The results are presented in Table 11 and are very 
similar to, and perhaps even stronger than, those in Table 5.  The coefficient for the affected 
banks after August 2007 amounts to less than -0.14 and is highly significant in Model 1. We 
repeat the analysis in subsamples of consumer and mortgage loans and, again, the results are 
very similar. Model 4 confirms the results using a probit model as robustness check. 
 
INSERT TABLE 11 HERE 
 
6.3. Definition of events and affected banks 
As argued in the description of the definition of the empirical strategy in Section 3, the reported 
results in the main tables are based on the event date August 2007 when the losses of the 
Landesbanken became privately  observable to their owners and thus the savings banks, for 
example, in supervisory board meetings. The event date can be alternatively chosen by defining 
the day on which the losses become publicly observable. This is the case in the third quarter of 
2007 for Sachsen LB, in the fourth quarter of 2007 for West LB, and in the first quarter of 2008 
for Bayern LB. We thus rerun our empirical analyses with this alternative choice of event dates 
and report the results in Table 12. The results are very similar to those reported in Table 5 and 




INSERT TABLE 12 HERE 
 
As also argued in Section 3, the Landesbanken other than Sachsen LB, West LB, and Bayern LB 
do not show subprime losses during the sample period. The savings banks in these regions are 
thus treated as nonaffected banks in the main empirical analysis. While this definition is clear 
even at hindsight for most Landesbanken, it might be questioned for LBBW and HSH Nordbank. 
Both banks did not show losses during the sample period and publicly announced losses only in 
November 2008. Nonetheless, it could be argued that their earnings in the second quarter of 2008 
were somewhat lower than those in the first quarter of 2008 so that insiders might have already 
foreseen their upcoming problems. We thus rerun our analyses by including LBBW and HSH 
Nordbank as affected banks for the second quarter of 2008. The results in Models 5 to 8 of Table 
12 are again very similar to those of Table 5.  An alternative robustness test would be to drop 
these two Landesbanken from the sample altogether.  We do not report these tables to conserve 
space, but again we find the results are very similar. 
 
6.4. Parallel-trend assumption 
We further want to test whether the difference-in-differences  tests are not driven by 
inappropriate identification assumptions. The key identifying assumption in our empirical 
strategy is that trends related to loan acceptance rates are the same among affected and 
nonaffected banks in the absence of the financial crisis. In Table 2, we observe a parallel trend in 
average loan acceptance  rates between affected and nonaffected banks before August 2007, 
which is an indicator that this assumption is reasonable. In this subsection, we formally test the 
parallel-trend assumption using out-of-sample data. We implement a control experiment using a 




  If the parallel-trend  assumption holds, we should see no difference in 
acceptance rates before and after the event between the affected and nonaffected banks. 
We obtain data for the out-of-sample period from S-Rating for the same loan types from the 
same banks with the same internal scoring mechanism. We then implement the difference-in-
                                                 
15 Control experiments or placebo events are commonly used in the literature to test the parallel-trend assumption 
(Duflo, 2001) or correct biases in the DID estimate (Huang, 2008).  
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differences test around the fictitious event described in Section 3. We have information about 
504,179 consumer and mortgage loans in this sample. The coefficients in Eq. (1) describe the 
trend in loan acceptance rates after July 2006 for affected versus nonaffected banks, and the 
difference is the DID estimate. Holding everything else constant, loan acceptance rates increase 
by 0.03% for the affected banks after the event (p = 0.919) and by 0.18% for nonaffected banks 
(p = 0.379). The DID estimate is insignificant (p = 0.735), indicating no change in acceptance 
rates for the affected banks relative to the nonaffected banks,  which further supports the 
identifying assumption of our empirical strategy. 
 
6.5. Borrower quality and loan acceptance rates 
Finally, we want to make sure that our results are not driven by a change in ex ante borrower 
quality. If the distribution of borrower quality changes over time and for affected versus 
nonaffected banks, can this explain why affected banks reduce consumer lending more than 
nonaffected banks? This question has two aspects: a declining trend in borrower quality and a 
change in the risk distribution of the applicants of affected versus  nonaffected banks. Our 
difference-in-differences approach controls for the first aspect. If there is a common trend in 
borrower quality, it is captured by the difference-in-differences approach and thus the control 
group of nonaffected banks. For the second aspect, we use a chi-square test to analyze whether 
the risk distribution is independent of consumers applying before or after August 2007 and with 
affected and nonaffected banks. We find evidence that no association exists between the risk 
distribution and whether the application is made before or after August 2007 for either affected 
banks (Cramer’s V amounts to 0.029) or nonaffected banks (Cramer’s V amounts to 0.026). 
There is thus no statistically significant trend in borrower quality over time. We further test 
whether there is a change in the risk distribution for affected versus nonaffected banks using the 
same test. We find that Cramer’s V is 0.041 before August 2007 and 0.044 after August 2007. 
Thus, the risk distribution of applicants is independent of whether or not a bank is affected by the 
financial crisis both before and after August 2007, which implies that there is no change in 
borrower quality for affected versus nonaffected banks. Thus our results are not driven by a 






In this paper we take advantage of a unique data set to study the real effects of the financial crisis 
through the global supply of credit.  We have the universe of loan applications and loan 
approvals for German savings banks in a time period that spans the financial crisis.  We have a 
unique experimental setting in that some of our local savings banks, while they engage in narrow 
banking, are substantially affected by the US financial crisis through the Landesbanken that they 
own, which in turn have substantial exposure to subprime assets in the United States.  We can 
compare their lending patterns with savings banks that do not have similar exposure. Using data 
from 2006–2008 (pre-  and post-crisis) we are also able to distinguish between demand and 
supply effects of the financial crisis.  While there is an overall decrease in demand of loan 
applications once the crisis strikes, we do not find significant differences in the loan applications 
for affected versus nonaffected banks. 
 
We find evidence of a substantial supply effect in bank credit to retail customers.  Using a 
difference-in-differences analysis we find that the affected savings banks reject more loan 
applications than the nonaffected banks.  These results survive a large number of robustness 
checks.   We also find that savings banks curtail their lending in particular when they are small 
and more liquidity-constrained. In addition, there is a bigger effect for mortgages as compared 
with consumer loans and a slight migration to quality. However, the distribution of ex ante 
borrower and portfolio risk for affected and nonaffected banks before and after the onset of the 
financial crisis is not statistically significantly different.  Our evidence thus suggests that banks 
cut back on lending to preserve liquidity. Finally, we assess the effect of bank-depositor 
relationships and find that relationships help mitigate the supply side effect. Our findings 
illustrate the global linkages for the supply of credit and suggest a number of avenues for future 
research and policy makers. A key aspect is whether and to what extent the reduced supply of 
credit in some regions affects the real economy in these regions, e.g., through a reduction of 
consumer spending or a reduction in construction. Related to this, it is important to understand 
from a policy perspective how the supply of credit can be secured even if certain banks are 
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Main variables definitions 
 
Variable  Definition 
Inference variables   
Affected  Dummy variable equal to one if the application is made to a savings bank 
that  owns one of the affected Landesbanken (Bayern LB, Sachsen LB, 
West LB). 
Post-August 2007  Dummy variable equal to one if the loan application is made after August 
2007. 
Affected x Post-August 2007  Interaction term: dummy variable equal to one if loan application is made 
to an affected savings bank after August 2007. 
Nonaffected x Post-August 2007  Interaction term: dummy variable equal to one if loan application is made 
to a nonaffected savings bank after August 2007. 
Loan type   
Mortgage Loans  Dummy variable equal to one if the loan type is a mortgage loan. 
 
Dependent variable   
Accepted (Yes/No)  Dummy variable equal to one if the loan application was accepted. 
Loan amount  The loan amount requested by the borrower in euros. The loan amount is 
available only for the subset of mortgage loans. 
No. of weekly loan applications  Number of loan applications per bank per week. 
 
Control variable   
Consumer Confidence  Measured by the Konsumklimaindex (consumer climate index) of the 
market research company GfK and is based on a monthly survey of two 
thousand consumers of age 14 and above. The index contains questions 
about how much consumers expect the economy and their income to grow 
and what they plan to consume. One sample question is: “Do you think it is 
currently advisable to spend a lot of money for consumption?”  Three 
answers are possible: advisable, neutral, and not advisable. The answers are 
transferred into numbers and aggregated for all parts. The index long-term 
average is about zero. 
Borrower characteristics   
Internal Rating  Based on a quantitative score that uses a scorecard at the loan application 
stage to facilitate and standardize the credit decision process across all 
savings banks. This credit score adds up individual scores based on age, 
occupation  (for example,  nature of an applicant’s job and years the 
applicant has been in the job), and monthly repayment capacity based on 
the borrower’s available income. The score also contains information on 
the existence and use of the borrower’s checking and other accounts, i.e., 
credit or debit cards, the use of credit lines, and assets held in the bank. 
Based on past defaults of borrowers with similar characteristics, this score 
is consolidated into an internal credit rating,  which is associated with a 
default probability for the borrower. 
 
Relationships characteristics   
Relationships  Dummy variable equal to one if the loan applicant had a checking account 
with the same bank before the application. The regional principle excludes 





Fig. 1. Aggregate lending in Germany. 
The figure shows the aggregate lending of German banks for the January 2006 to June 2008 period. Panel 
A shows the aggregate lending (corporate and  consumers) for all bank groups. Panel  B shows the 
aggregate consumer and corporate lending for savings banks. Loan types do not include mortgage loans. 
Source is Deutsche Bundesbank. 
 
Panel A: Total lending 
 
 






Fig. 2. Geographical reach of affected Landesbanken. 
The figure shows the geographical reach of the three Landesbanken that are affected by the financial 
crisis after August 2007 and during our sample period. They represent Westdeutsche Landesbank or West 
LB (North Rhine-Westphalia), Bayerische Landesbank or Bayern LB (Bavaria), and Landesbank Sachsen 








Ownership structures of Landesbanken 
This table provides an overview of the German Landesbanken and their respective owners. Ownership by 
savings banks is denoted by (S). The upper part of the table shows the three Landesbanken that are 
affected by the financial crisis after August 2007 and during our sample period. The lower part shows the 
remaining eight Landesbanken. The information on the Landesbanken is provided by Bundesverband 
Öffentlicher Banken Deutschlands VÖB and represents the status as of May 2008.  
 
Landesbank Owner Share (percent)
Sachsen LB
(acquired by Landesbank Baden-Württemberg on March 6, 2008) Sachsen-Finanzgruppe (S) 62,960
Freistaat Sachsen 37,040
Bayern LB Freistaat Bayern 50,000
Sparkassenverband Bayern (S) 50,000
West LB NRW Bank 31,200
Rheinischer Sparkassen- und Giroverband (S) 25,200




Bremer Landesbank Kreditanstalt Oldenburg-Girozentrale Nord LB 92,500
Freie Hansestadt Bremen 7,500
HSH Nordbank Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg 35,380
Land Schleswig-Holstein 19,960
Sparkassen- und Giroverband für Schleswig-Holstein (S) 18,050
J.C. Flowers 26,610
Landesbank Baden-Württemberg Land Baden-Württemberg 35,611
Sparkassenverband Baden-Württemberg (S) 35,611
Landeshauptstadt Stuttgart 18,932
L-Bank, Landeskreditbank Baden-Württemberg 4,923
Sparkassen- und Giroverband Rheinland-Pfalz (S) 4,923
Landesbank Berlin Landesbank Berlin Holding AG 100,000
Landesbank Hessen-Thüringen Sparkassen- und Giroverband Hessen-Thüringen (S) 85,000
Land Hessen 10,000
Freistaat Thüringen 5,000
Landesbank Rheinland-Pfalz Landesbank Baden-Württemberg 100,000
Norddeutsche Landesbank Land Niedersachsen 41,750
Land Sachsen-Anhalt 8,250
Sparkassenverband Niedersachsen (S) 37,250
Sparkassenbeteiligungsverband Sachsen-Anhalt 7,530
Sparkassenbeteiligungszweckverband Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 5,220
Saar LB Bayern LB 75,100










This table presents summary statistics for the sample of loan applications from German savings banks 
from July 2006 through June 2008. The number of observations corresponds to the number of loan 
applications. Loan amounts are available only for the subset of mortgage loans. The number of weekly 
loan applications is presented in bank-week units. 
 
  
Number of  
observations  Mean 
Standard 
deviation  p(25)  Median  p(75)  Minimum  Maximum 
                 
Inference variables                 
Affected    1,296,726  0.365  0.481  0  0  1  0  1 
Post-August 2007  1,296,726  0.493  0.500  0  0  1  0  1 
Affected x Post-
August 2007  1,296,726  0.180  0.385  0  0  0  0  1 
Nonaffected x Post-
August 2007  1,296,726  0.313  0.464  0  0  1  0  1 
                 
Loan type                 
Mortgage loans  1,296,726  0.285  0.452  0  0  1  0  1 
                 
Dependent variables                 
Accepted (Yes/No)  1,296,726  0.956  0.205  1  1  1  0  1 
Loan amount  317,616  86,609  69,360  25,000  70,900  132,000  5,000  238,000 
No. of weekly loan 
applications  33,685  40  76  11  18  40  11  927 
                 
Borrower characteristics               
Internal Rating  1,244,441  6  2.944  4  6  8  1  12 
                 
Relationship characteristics               
Relationships  1,296,726  0.941  0.235  1  1  1  0  1 







Aggregate acceptance rates, affected versus nonaffected banks 
This table presents  aggregate acceptance rates for affected versus nonaffected banks over time. 
Acceptance rates are aggregated across each quarter. The first Landesbank (Sachsen LB) was directly hit 
by the financial crisis in August 2007 (Q3-2007). At the same time, the massive exposure and 
vulnerability of the other Landesbanken (Bayern LB and West LB) also became obvious. 
 
Quarter 
Aggregate acceptance rate 
Affected banks  Nonaffected banks 
     
Q3-2006  97.34%  98.33% 
Q4-2006  97.58  97.85 
Q1-2007  97.75  97.67 
Q2-2007  97.61  97.23 
Q3-2007  93.96  97.52 
Q4-2007  85.64  97.20 
Q1-2008  84.58  97.53 























Loan acceptance rates at the onset of the financial crisis (bivariate tests) 
This table presents mean difference-in-differences  (DID) estimates of loan acceptance rates. Savings 
banks are classified into two groups: affected, when savings banks are owner of one of the three 
Landesbanken that are affected by the US subprime mortgage crisis after August 2007; nonaffected, 
otherwise. Panels A through C report the results for the pooled sample (consumer and mortgage loans), 
only consumer loans, and only mortgage loans, respectively. Standard errors are reported in parentheses 
The number of observations is reported in brackets. The DID estimate is printed in bold.  Panel D reports 
mean DID estimates for the sample segregated by rating class. For brevity, we report only p-values of the 
difference and DID estimates. 
***, 
**, and 
* denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and10% level, respectively. 
 
       
Panel A: Pooled consumer  
and mortgage loans   All     Affected  Nonaffected  Difference 
           
Before August 2007 
0.976    0.975  0.977  0.002*** 
(0.0002)    (0.0003)  (0.0002)  (0.0004) 
  [657,309]    [239,644]  [417,665]   
           
After August 2007 
0.943    0.864  0.976  0.113*** 
(0.0003)    (0.0007)  (0.0002)  (0.0007) 
  [639,417]    [233,968]  [405,449]   
           
Difference  -0.041***    -0.111***  -0.001*  -0.110*** 
  (0.0003)    (0.0008)  (0.0003)  (0.000) 
           
Panel B: Consumer loans             
           
Before August 2007 
0.978    0.979  0.977  0.002*** 
(0.0002)    (0.0003)  (0.0003)  (0.0004) 
  [464,399]    [183,037]  [281,362]   
           
After August 2007 
0.936    0.874  0.978  0.104*** 
(0.0004)    (0.0008)  (0.0003)  (0.0008) 
  [462,426]    [186,971]  [ 275,455]   
           
Difference  -0.042***    -0.105***  0.001*  -0.105*** 
  (0.0004)    (0.0008)  (0.0004)  (0.000) 
           
Panel C: Mortgage loans             
           
Before August 2007 
0.976    0.961  0.977   .0163*** 
(0.0002)    (0.0008)  (0.0004)  (0.0009) 
  [192,910 ]    [56,607]  [136,303]   
           
After August 2007 
0.943    0.824  0.974  0.150*** 
(0.0003)    (0.0018)  (0.0004)  (0.0018) 
  [176,991]    [46,997]  [129,994]   
           
Difference  -0.038***    -0.137***  -0.003***  -0.134*** 





Panel D: Diff-in-diff by rating classes 
  Before August 2007  After August 2007   
  Affected  Nonaffected  Difference 




Borrower risk (Internal Rating)           
           
1  0.986  0.993  0.007  0.876  0.993  0.117  0.110 
      <0.0001      <0.0001  <0.0001 
2  0.988  0.989  0.000  0.889  0.989  0.100  0.099 
      (0.726)      <0.0001  <0.0001 
3  0.989  0.987  -0.002  0.898  0.989  0.091  0.093 
      (0.055)      <0.0001  <0.0001 
4  0.990  0.988  -0.003  0.903  0.988  0.085  0.088 
      (0.001)      <0.0001  <0.0001 
5  0.988  0.987  0.000  0.890  0.987  0.097  0.097 
      (0.607)      <0.0001  <0.0001 
6  0.986  0.985  0.000  0.890  0.986  0.095  0.096 
      (0.629)      <0.0001  <0.0001 
7  0.983  0.985  0.002  0.890  0.985  0.095  0.093 
      (0.046)      <0.0001  <0.0001 
8  0.978  0.981  0.003  0.870  0.980  0.110  0.107 
      (0.005)      <0.0001  <0.0001 
9  0.973  0.975  0.002  0.859  0.977  0.118  0.116 
      0.285      <0.0001  <0.0001 
10  0.958  0.958  0.000  0.817  0.949  0.132  0.132 
      0.841      <0.0001  <0.0001 
11  0.885  0.917  0.032  0.715  0.904  0.189  0.157 
      <0.0001      <0.0001  <0.0001 
12  0.793  0.804  0.010  0.650  0.811  0.160  0.150 





Loan acceptance rates at the onset of the financial crisis (multivariate tests) 
We estimate the probability that a bank accepts a loan application. All variables are defined in the 
Appendix. The borrower internal rating is the bank’s internal risk assessment at the time the loan 
application is made. The models are estimated using a linear probability model with bank-specific fixed 
effects and year fixed effects.  Panel A reports regression results for the pooled sample (consumer loans 
and mortgage loans). Panel B reports the results for the consumer loan and mortgage loan subsample. 
Models 3, 6, and 9 further adjust the standard errors for possible autocorrelation at the bank level.   The 
diagnostic section of Panel A reports the difference-in-differences (DID) estimate as well as the p-value 
from the Wald test under the H0 that the DID estimate is equal to zero. The diagnostic section of Panel B 
further reports the p-value from the Wald test under the H0 that, among the owners of the affected 
Landesbanken, loan applicants for mortgage loans are as likely to be accepted as applicants for consumer 
loans after the start of the financial crisis.  Intercept, bank,  and year fixed  effects are not shown. 
Heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors are shown in parentheses.  
***, 
**, and 
* denote significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and10% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Pooled sample (consumer and mortgage loans) 
   Consumer and mortgage loans 
  (1)     (2)     (3) 
                 
(1) Affected x Post-August 2007  -0.071***  (0.0008)    -0.072***  (0.0008)    -0.072***  (0.0227) 
(2) Unaffected x Post-August 2007  0.011***  (0.0006)    0.010***  (0.0007)    0.010*  (0.0056) 
                 
Borrower risk (Internal rating)                 
1  0.228***  (0.0023)    0.228***  (0.0023)    0.228***  (0.0269) 
2  0.216***  (0.0023)    0.216***  (0.0023)    0.216***  (0.0257) 
3  0.209***  (0.0022)    0.209***  (0.0022)    0.209***  (0.0248) 
4  0.207***  (0.0022)    0.207***  (0.0022)    0.207***  (0.0246) 
5  0.203***  (0.0022)    0.203***  (0.0022)    0.203***  (0.0243) 
6  0.200***  (0.0022)    0.200***  (0.0022)    0.200***  (0.0243) 
7  0.197***  (0.0022)    0.197***  (0.0022)    0.197***  (0.0242) 
8  0.190***  (0.0022)    0.190***  (0.0022)    0.190***  (0.0239) 
9  0.182***  (0.0023)    0.182***  (0.0023)    0.182***  (0.0233) 
10  0.157***  (0.0023)    0.157***  (0.0023)    0.157***  (0.0216) 
11  0.097***  (0.0026)    0.097***  (0.0026)    0.097***  (0.0147) 
                 
Consumer Confidence        0.001***  (0.0001)    0.0010  (0.0007) 
Time fixed effects  Yes    Yes    Yes 
Bank fixed effects  Yes    Yes    Yes 
Standard errors clustered at bank level          Yes 
                 
Diagnostics                 
Adj.  R
2  21.84%    21.84%    21.84% 
Wald Test: All coefficients = 0 (p-value)  <0.0001    <0.0001    <0.0001 
Difference-in-differences           
DID estimate: (1) - (2)  0.082***    0.082***    0.082*** 
Wald test: (1) - (2) [p-value]  <0.0001    <0.0001    <0.0001 
Number of observations  1,244,441    1,244,441    1,244,441 




Panel B: Consumer and mortgage loans                         
  Consumer loans  Mortgage loans  
  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
                         
(1) Affected x Post-August 2007  -0.059***  (0.0009)  -0.060***  (0.0009)  -0.060***  (0.019)  -0.115***  (0.0022)  -0.116***  (0.0022)  -0.116***  (0.0457) 
(2) Unaffected x Post-August 2007  0.014***  (0.0008)  0.013***  (0.0008)  0.013**  (0.0053)  0.007***  (0.0012)  0.005***  (0.0012)  0.0050  (0.0089) 
                         
Borrower risk (Internal Rating)                         
1  0.222***  (0.0026)  0.222***  (0.0026)  0.222***  (0.0256)  0.215***  (0.0059)  0.215***  (0.0059)  0.215***  (0.0769) 
2  0.215***  (0.0025)  0.215***  (0.0025)  0.215***  (0.0247)  0.203***  (0.0059)  0.203***  (0.0059)  0.203**  (0.079) 
3  0.212***  (0.0024)  0.212***  (0.0024)  0.212***  (0.0243)  0.191***  (0.0059)  0.191***  (0.0059)  0.191**  (0.0785) 
4  0.210***  (0.0024)  0.210***  (0.0024)  0.210***  (0.0241)  0.188***  (0.0059)  0.188***  (0.0059)  0.188**  (0.0785) 
5  0.207***  (0.0024)  0.207***  (0.0024)  0.207***  (0.0238)  0.176***  (0.0059)  0.176***  (0.0059)  0.176**  (0.0769) 
6  0.205***  (0.0024)  0.205***  (0.0024)  0.205***  (0.0238)  0.165***  (0.0059)  0.165***  (0.0059)  0.165**  (0.0747) 
7  0.203***  (0.0024)  0.203***  (0.0024)  0.203***  (0.0237)  0.153***  (0.0059)  0.153***  (0.0059)  0.153**  (0.0696) 
8  0.198***  (0.0024)  0.198***  (0.0024)  0.198***  (0.0235)  0.132***  (0.006)  0.132***  (0.006)  0.132**  (0.0582) 
9  0.189***  (0.0024)  0.189***  (0.0024)  0.189***  (0.0231)  0.129***  (0.006)  0.129***  (0.006)  0.129**  (0.0538) 
10  0.163***  (0.0025)  0.163***  (0.0025)  0.163***  (0.0226)  0.109***  (0.0061)  0.109***  (0.0061)  0.109***  (0.0388) 
11  0.096***  (0.0028)  0.096***  (0.0028)  0.096***  (0.016)  0.086***  (0.0064)  0.086***  (0.0064)  0.086***  (0.0226) 
                         
Consumer Confidence      0.001***  (0.001)  0.0010  (0.0007)      0.001***  (0.0002)  0.0010  (0.0012) 
Time fixed effects  Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes   
Bank fixed effects  Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes   
Standard errors clustered at bank level          Yes            Yes   
Diagnostics                         
Adj.  R
2  23.17%  23.18%  23.18%  23.88%  23.88%  23.88% 
Wald test: All coefficients = 0 (p-value)  <0.0001  <0.0001  <0.0001  <0.0001  <0.0001  <0.0001 
Difference-in-differences             
DID estimate: (1) - (2)  0.073***  0.073***  0.073***  0.122***  0.121***  0.121*** 
Wald test: (1) = (2) [p-value]  <0.0001  <0.0001  <0.0001  <0.0001  <0.0001  <0.0001 
Within treatment group:                         
(B) - (A)              0.055***  0.055***  0.055*** 
Wald test: (B) - (A) [p-value ]              <0.0001  <0.0001  <0.0001 









Loan acceptance rates and bank heterogeneity 
We estimate the probability that a bank accepts a loan application. All variables are defined in the Appendix. Log (Bank Size) is the natural logarithm of the bank’s 
asset size in millions of euros. Liquidity (% of Total Assets) is the ratio of the bank’s cash and marketable securities to total assets. The borrower internal rating is 
the bank’s internal risk assessment at the time the loan application is made. The models are estimated using a linear probability model with year fixed effects.  
Intercept and year fixed effects are not shown. Heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors clustered at the bank level are shown in parentheses.  ***, **, and * 
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and10% level, respectively 
  Dependent variable: Accepted (Yes/No) 
  
Affected banks 
(post -August 2007) 
  Pooled sample  Consumer loans  Mortgage loans  Pooled sample  Consumer loans  Mortgage loans 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
 Log (Bank Size)  0.049***  (0.016)  0.044***  (0.0156)  0.0794***  (0.0253)             
 Liquidity (% of Total Assets)              16.149***  (6.311)  13.910***  (5.26)  31.866***  (11.2482) 
Borrower risk (Internal Rating)                         
1  0.227***  (0.046)  0.278***  (0.0415)  0.348***  (0.0694)  0.231***  (0.0481)  0.281***  (0.0429)  0.332***  (0.067) 
2  0.245***  (0.0416)  0.279***  (0.0409)  0.304***  (0.0666)  0.246***  (0.0427)  0.278***  (0.0418)  0.290***  (0.0633) 
3  0.254***  (0.0401)  0.267***  (0.0401)  0.298***  (0.067)  0.253***  (0.0411)  0.264***  (0.0409)  0.287***  (0.064) 
4  0.260***  (0.0403)  0.264***  (0.0401)  0.333***  (0.0676)  0.258***  (0.0411)  0.261***  (0.0409)  0.321***  (0.0645) 
5  0.250***  (0.0393)  0.253***  (0.0393)  0.307***  (0.0648)  0.247***  (0.0401)  0.249***  (0.0401)  0.294***  (0.0623) 
6  0.248***  (0.0388)  0.249***  (0.0386)  0.304***  (0.0658)  0.245***  (0.0394)  0.246***  (0.0394)  0.294***  (0.063) 
7  0.250***  (0.0391)  0.252***  (0.0392)  0.276***  (0.0591)  0.245***  (0.0398)  0.247***  (0.0399)  0.260***  (0.0569) 
8  0.229***  (0.0402)  0.230***  (0.0403)  0.268***  (0.0588)  0.225***  (0.0406)  0.225***  (0.0409)  0.256***  (0.0566) 
9  0.218***  (0.0381)  0.218***  (0.0379)  0.229***  (0.0677)  0.212***  (0.0385)  0.213***  (0.0384)  0.224***  (0.0641) 
10  0.173***  (0.0376)  0.174***  (0.0379)  0.156***  (0.0493)  0.168***  (0.0378)  0.170***  (0.0382)  0.146***  (0.0485) 
11  0.072***  (0.0263)  0.071***  (0.0266)  0.0716  (0.0445)  0.071***  (0.0268)  0.071***  (0.0272)  0.0570  (0.0439) 
                         
Consumer Confidence  0.0135  (0.0099)  0.016*  (0.0096)  -0.0076  (0.0149)  0.0128  (0.0098)  0.0155  (0.0096)  -0.0082  (0.0149) 
Time fixed effects  Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Standard errors clustered at bank level  Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Diagnostics                         
Adj.  R
2  5.13%  5.64%  6.95%  6.26%  6.44%  10.21% 
Wald test: All coefficients = 0 (p-value)  <0.0001  <0.0001  <0.0001  <0.0001  <0.0001  <0.0001 
Mortgage - consumer loans                         
Δ [Log(Bank Size)] or  
Δ [ Liquidity (% of Total Assets)]      0.035***          17.965*** 
p-value          <0.0001          <0.0001 





Demand for loans after the onset of the financial crisis (applications) 
The dependent variable is the number of loans requested by borrowers each week. We estimate the regressions for the 
pooled sample (consumer and mortgage loans, Columns 1 and 2) as well as consumer (Columns 3 and 4) and mortgage 
loans (Columns 5 and 6). The regressions are estimated using a fixed effect ordinary least squares (OLS) model and a 
negative binomial model with fixed effects to account for the nature of the dependent variable (count data). We further 
adjust the standard errors for possible autocorrelation at the state level.   The diagnostic section of the table reports the 
difference-in-differences (DID) estimate as well as the p-value from the Wald test under the H0 that the DID estimate is 
equal to zero. The unit of our analysis is the number of weekly loan applications of each single bank and not an individual 
loan application. This reduces our sample size compared with Table 4 and Table 5. We therefore use the mean internal 
rating (averaging the internal rating score across all loan applications per bank in a given week) to control for borrower 
risk. When using the negative binomial model, we further report the likelihood ratio test and in each case reject the H0 
that conditional mean and median of the number of weekly loan applications is identical indicating overdispersion. We 
further do not find an elevated number of zeros in the dependent variable and therefore do not report the regressions using 
either Poisson or the zero inflated Poisson model. Intercept, bank and year fixed effects are not shown. Heteroskedasticity 
consistent standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
***, 
**, and 
* denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and10% level, 
respectively. 
 
   Consumer and mortgage loans     Consumer loans     Mortgage loans 
 
(1) OLS 
    
(2) Negative 
Binomial    
(3) OLS 
    
(4) Negative 
binomial    
(5) OLS 
    
(6) Negative 
binomial 
                       
(1) Affected x Post-August 2007  -8.131**    -0.207**    -8.133**    -0.189**    -10.4366    -0.244** 
  (3.5957)    (0.0896)    (3.254)    (0.0895)    (5.9764)    (0.1161) 
(2) Unaffected x Post-August 2007 
-9.749***    -0.284***    -10.753***    -0.291***    -12.249*    -0.257*** 
  (2.918)    (0.0514)    (2.1651)    (0.0429)    (5.83)    (0.072) 
                       
Mean internal rating  -1.245**    -0.039***    -1.423***    -0.0682***    -0.3932    0.0128 
  (0.635)    (0.015)    (0.4195)    (0.0159)    (0.8432)    (0.0189) 
Consumer Confidence  0.878*    0.023***    0.3830    0.020***    1.482**    0.0245*** 
  (0.4289)    (0.0045)    (0.3657)    (0.0038)    (0.5786)    (0.0068) 
                       
Time fixed effects  Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes 
Bank fixed effects  Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes 
Standard errors clustered at state level  Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes 
                       
Diagnostics                       
Adj.  R
2 / Pseudo-R
2  80.98%    22.10%    81.41%    22.03%    86.05%    23.04% 
LR-test: α = 0 (p-value)      <0.0001        <0.0001        <0.0001 
Difference-in-differences                       
DID estimate: (1) - (2)  1.6180    0.0770    2.6200    0.1010    1.8124    0.0130 
Wald test: (1) - (2) [p-value]  0.6599    0.4293    0.4581    0.3319    0.7939    0.7907 
Number of observations  32,638     32,638     25,822     25,822     6,816     6,816 Table 8 
The demand for loans after the onset of the financial crisis (loan amount) 
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the loan amount requested by the borrower. Loan 
amounts are available only for the subset of mortgage loans in our sample that corresponds to 317,583 
loans. The borrower internal rating is the bank’s internal risk assessment at the time the loan application is 
made. The regressions are estimated using a conditional fixed effect ordinary least squares (OLS) model. 
Column 3 further adjusts the standard errors for possible autocorrelation at the state level.  The diagnostic 
section of the table reports the DID estimate as well as the p-value from the Wald test under the H0 that 
the difference-in-differences (DID) estimate is equal to zero. The unit of our analysis is a loan application 
and not only an accepted loan.  Intercept, bank, and year fixed effects are not shown. Heteroskedasticity 
consistent standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
***, 
**, and 
* denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and10% level, respectively. 
 
   (1) OLS     (2) OLS     (3) OLS 
(1) Affected x Post-August 2007  -0.049***  (0.0091)    -0.049***  (0.0092)    -0.0490  (0.0203) 
(2) Nonaffected x Post-August 2007  -0.045***  (0.0063)    -0.044***  (0.0066)    -0.0444  (0.0211) 
                 
Borrower risk (Internal Rating)                 
1  -0.595***  (0.0146)    -0.595***  (0.0146)    -0.595***  (0.0268) 
2  -0.449***  (0.0154)    -0.449***  (0.0154)    -0.449***  (0.0133) 
3  -0.455***  (0.0154)    -0.455***  (0.0154)    -0.455***  (0.0101) 
4  -0.346***  (0.0152)    -0.346***  (0.0152)    -0.346***  (0.0359) 
5  -0.298***  (0.0151)    -0.298***  (0.0151)    -0.298***  (0.0324) 
6  -0.192***  (0.0151)    -0.192***  (0.0151)    -0.192***  (0.025) 
7  -0.117***  (0.015)    -0.117***  (0.015)    -0.117***  (0.022) 
8  -0.087***  (0.015)    -0.087***  (0.015)    -0.087***  (0.0117) 
9  -0.048***  (0.0149)    -0.048***  (0.0149)    -0.048***  (0.0112) 
10  -0.041***  (0.015)    -0.041***  (0.015)    -0.041***  (0.0134) 
11  -0.087***  (0.0159)    -0.087***  (0.0159)    -0.087***  (0.0106) 
                 
Consumer Confidence        -0.0004  (0.0012)    -0.0004  (0.0017) 
Time fixed effects  Yes    Yes    Yes 
Bank fixed effects  Yes    Yes    Yes 
Standard errors clustered at state level          Yes 
                 
Diagnostics                 
Adj.  R
2  14.17%    14.17%    14.17% 
Difference-in-differences                 
DID estimate: (1) - (2)  0.0046    0.0046    0.0046 
Wald test: (1) - (2) [p-value]  0.5762    0.5729    0.5953 








Bank-borrower relationships during the financial crisis  
We estimate the probability that a bank accepts a loan application. All variables are defined in the 
Appendix. The borrower internal rating is the bank’s internal risk assessment at the time the loan 
application is made. The models are estimated using a linear probability model with bank specific fixed 
effects and year fixed effects.  Intercept, bank, and year fixed effects are not shown. Heteroskedasticity 
consistent standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
***, 
**, and 
* denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% level, respectively. 
 
   Dependent variable: Accepted (Yes/No) 
  Pooled sample  Consumer loans  Mortgage loans 




(3) LPM   
          
Secular effects             
Post-August 2007  0.011***  (0.0006)  0.014***  (0.0006)  0.006***  (0.0012) 
Relationships  0.028***  (0.0019)  0.009***  (0.0019)  0.018***  (0.0025) 
Second level interactions             
Affected x Post-August 2007  -0.081***  (0.0008)  -0.072***  (0.0008)  -0.119***  (0.0022) 
Relationships x Post-August 2007  0.004**  (0.0022)  0.007*  (0.004)  -0.007***  (0.0027) 
Relationships x Affected  0.020***  (0.003)  0.016***  (0.004)  0.048***  (0.005) 
Diff-in-Diff-in-Diff             
Affected x Post-August 2007 x Relationships  0.049***  (0.005)  0.041***  (0.007)  0.018**  (0.008) 
             
Borrower risk (Internal Rating)             
1  0.221***  (0.0023)  0.218***  (0.0026)  0.206***  (0.0059) 
2  0.210***  (0.0023)  0.212***  (0.0025)  0.195***  (0.0059) 
3  0.204***  (0.0022)  0.209***  (0.0024)  0.184***  (0.0059) 
4  0.202***  (0.0022)  0.207***  (0.0024)  0.182***  (0.0059) 
5  0.198***  (0.0022)  0.203***  (0.0024)  0.172***  (0.0059) 
6  0.195***  (0.0022)  0.202***  (0.0024)  0.162***  (0.0059) 
7  0.193***  (0.0022)  0.200***  (0.0024)  0.151***  (0.0059) 
8  0.187***  (0.0022)  0.196***  (0.0024)  0.131***  (0.0059) 
9  0.180***  (0.0023)  0.188***  (0.0024)  0.128***  (0.0059) 
10  0.155***  (0.0023)  0.162***  (0.0025)  0.109***  (0.006) 
11  0.097***  (0.0026)  0.096***  (0.0028)  0.086***  (0.0064) 
             
Time fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Bank fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
             
Diagnostics             
Adj.  R
2  22.04%  23.25%  24.07% 
Wald test: All coefficients = 0 (p-value)  <0.0001  <0.0001  <0.0001 
Mortgage - consumer loans             
Δ[Affected x Post-August 2007]          0.047*** 
p-value           <0.0001 
Δ[Affected x Post-August 2007 x Relationships]        -0.023*** 
p-value           <0.0001 







Compare models for loan supply 
We estimate the probability that a bank accepts a loan application. All variables are defined in the 
Appendix. This table shows that results from the linear probability model are robust to probit as 
alternative assumption about the distribution of the error term. We compare the linear probability model 
and the probit model (with and without fixed effects). We only show the coefficients for the linear 
probability model as well as the marginal effects for the probit model, respectively, for the interaction of 
affected and nonaffected banks with post-August 2007. Heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors are 
shown in parentheses. 
***, 
**, and 
* denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
  
Dependent variable:  
Accepted (Yes/No)    
   Pooled sample     Consumer loans     Mortgage loans 
                 
Linear probability model                 
(1) Affected x Post-August 2007  -0.071***  (0.0008)    -0.059***  (0.0009)    -0.116***  (0.0022) 
(2) Nonaffected x Post -August 2007  0.010***  (0.0006)    0.014***  (0.0008)    0.005***  (0.0012) 
Diff-in-Diff (p-value)  <0.0001***     <0.0001***     <0.0001*** 
                 
Probit (without fixed effects)                 
(1) Affected x Post-August 2007  -0.081***  (0.0015)    -0.074***  (0.0016)    -0.095***  (0.0035) 
(2) Nonaffected x Post-August 2007  0.006***  (0.0006)    0.011***  (0.0006)    0.004***  (0.0013) 
Diff-in-Diff (p-value)  <0.0001***     <0.0001***     <0.0001*** 
                 
Probit (with fixed effects)                 
(1) Affected x Post-August 2007  -0.034***  (0.0009)    -0.025***  (0.0009)    -0.067***  (0.0031) 
(2) Nonaffected x Post-August 2007  0.004***  (0.0003)    0.005***  (0.0003)    0.001***  (0.0007) 








Geographic proximity and access to credit 
We estimate the probability that a bank accepts a loan application. All variables are defined in the Appendix. The 
borrower internal rating is the bank’s internal risk assessment at the time the loan application is made. The models 
are estimated using a linear probability model (LPM) with bank pair-specific fixed effects in Regressions 1 to 3 and 
a probit model with standard errors clustered at the bank pair level in Regression 4. Heteroskedasticity consistent 
standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level, respectively. 
 
   Pooled sample,   Consumer loans,   Mortgage loans,  Pooled sample, 
Dependent variable 
LPM,  LPM,  LPM,  Probit 
Accepted (Yes/No)  Accepted (Yes/No)  Accepted (Yes/No)  Accepted (Yes/No) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
         
(1) Affected x Post-August 2007  -0.144***  (0.0022)  -0.114***  (0.0024)  -0.267***  (0.0055)  -0.149***  (0.0737) 
(2) Nonaffected x Post-August 2007  0.007***  (0.0024)  0.011***  (0.0025)  0.015**  (0.006)  0.0052  (0.0146) 
Affected  -0.009***  (0.0016)  -0.024***  (0.0017)  0.021***  (0.0049)  -0.0174  (0.0156) 
                 
                 
Borrower risk (Internal Rating)                 
1  0.145***  (0.0034)  0.185***  (0.0053)  0.187***  (0.0138)  0.041***  (0.0091) 
2  0.165***  (0.0039)  0.187***  (0.0045)  0.188***  (0.0142)  0.042***  (0.0074) 
3  0.168***  (0.0035)  0.180***  (0.0036)  0.172***  (0.0143)  0.047***  (0.0082) 
4  0.172***  (0.0033)  0.177***  (0.0034)  0.186***  (0.0144)  0.051***  (0.0087) 
5  0.168***  (0.0033)  0.172***  (0.0033)  0.178***  (0.0144)  0.051***  (0.0087) 
6  0.169***  (0.0033)  0.173***  (0.0033)  0.163***  (0.0146)  0.053***  (0.0089) 
7  0.168***  (0.0033)  0.171***  (0.0033)  0.160***  (0.0149)  0.053***  (0.0092) 
8  0.154***  (0.0033)  0.156***  (0.0033)  0.137***  (0.0153)  0.048***  (0.0079) 
9  0.147***  (0.0034)  0.148***  (0.0034)  0.127***  (0.0159)  0.045***  (0.0076) 
10  0.125***  (0.0035)  0.128***  (0.0035)  0.059***  (0.017)  0.038***  (0.0077) 
11  0.066***  (0.0038)  0.067***  (0.0037)  0.046***  (0.0188)  0.022***  (0.0054) 
Consumer Confidence  -0.0010  (0.0004)  -0.0005  (0.0004)  -0.0002  (0.001)  -0.0011  (0.0038) 
Time fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Pairwise fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes   
Standard errors clustered at bank pair        Yes 
         
Diagnostics                 
Adj.  R
2  10.30%  9.87%  17.80%  19.24% 
Number of Clusters  31  31  30  31 
Wald test: All coefficients = 0 (p-value)  <0.0001  <0.0001  <0.0001  <0.0001 
Difference-in-differences         
DID estimate: (1) - (2)  0.151***  0.103***  0.252***  0.154*** 
Wald test: (1) - (2) [p-value]  <0.0001  <0.0001  <0.0001  <0.0001 
Number of observations  206,083  171,901  34,182  206,083 
                  
 Table 12 
Public announcements of subprime losses 
We estimate the probability that a bank accepts a loan application. All variables are defined in the Appendix. The borrower internal 
rating is the bank’s internal risk assessment at the time the loan application is made. The models are estimated using a linear 
probability model with bank-specific fixed effects and year fixed effects.  In Models 1 to 4 we include Sachsen LB, West LB, and 
Bayern LB in the group of affected banks and identify the following quarters in which the announcements have been made: Sachsen 
LB: Q3-2007, West LB: Q4-2007, and Bayern LB: Q1-2008. In Models 5 to 8, we also include HSH Nordbank and LBBW in the 
group of affected Landesbanken and define Q2 2008 as the event date when they reported losses. We report only the difference-in-
differences  (DID)  estimate (Affected  *  Post  Public) and triple-diff estimate (Relationships  *  Affected  *  Post  Public). 
Heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and10% 
level, respectively. 
 
  Pooled  Consumer  Mortgages  Pooled    Pooled  Consumer  Mortgages  Pooled 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)    (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
                   
Affected * Post Public  -0.064***  -0.055***  -0.105***  -0.102***    -0.050***  -0.043***  -0.079***  -0.072*** 
  (0.0177)  (0.0158)  (0.0346)  (0.0045)    (0.0147)  (0.0133)  (0.0248)  (0.0038) 
Relationships * Affected * Post Public        0.039***          0.021*** 
        (0.0045)          (0.0038) 
                   
Internal rating  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Consumer Confidence  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Time fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Bank fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
                   
Diagnostics                   
Adj.  R
2  21.45%  22.74%  23.36%  21.60%    21.27%  22.59%  23.04%  21.41% 
Wald test: all coefficients = 0 (p-value)  <0.0001  <0.0001  <0.0001  <0.0001    <0.0001  <0.0001  <0.0001  <0.0001 
Number of observations  1,244,441  926,825  317,616  1,244,441    1,244,441  926,825  317,616  1,244,441 
 
 